

Message Text

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FM USDEL MBFR VIENNA

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S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 6 MBFR VIENNA 0156

FROM US REP MBFR

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PARM, NATO

SUBJECT: MBFR: INFORMAL SESSION WITH EASTERN

REPS JULY 10, 1974

REF: MBFR VIENNA 0154

FOLLOWING IS CONTINUATION OF REPORT OF INFORMAL SESSION
WITH EASTERN REPS ON JULY 10, 1974. PARAGRAPHS 1 THROUGH
7, CONTAINING SUMMARY, TRANSMITTED REFTEL.

8. KHESTOV AS HOST GREETED PARTICIPANTS. HE OFFERED
TO LET WESTERN REPS TAKE THE LEAD, BUT SINCE ALLIED REPS HAD
EARLIER AGREED THAT IT WAS TACTICALLY ADVISABLE TO MAKE
THEIR OWN STATEMENT AFTER THE MID POINT OF THE INFORMAL
SESSION, THEY INDICATED DESIRE THAT KHESTOV BEGIN

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THE PROCEEDINGS. KHESTOV SAID HE WOULD LIKE TO SUM UP EASTERN

VIEWS ON THE QUESTIONS WHICH HAD BEEN THE SUBJECT OF THESE INFORMAL MEETINGS. AS PARTICIPANTS WERE AWARE, DURING PAST INFORMAL MEETINGS, PARTICIPANTS HAD DISCUSSED QUESTIONS RELATED TO THE REDUCTION OF ARMED FORCES AND ARMAMENTS IN CENTRAL EUROPE, AND PARTICULARLY THE QUESTION OF WHOSE FORCES SHOULD BE REDUCED FROM THE OUTSET. TO SUM UP THE DISCUSSION OF THIS QUESTION, THE WESTERN REPRESENTATIVES STILL MAINTAINED THAT THE UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION SHOULD BE THE FIRST TO REDUCE THEIR GROUND FORCES FROM THE BEGINNING. THE EASTERN POSITION ON WHICH EAST CONTINUED TO INSIST WAS THAT REDUCTIONS FROM THE OUTSET SHOULD COVER THE ARMED FORCES AND ARMAMENTS OF ALL ELEVEN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS. SINCE THIRD ROUND OF THE VIENNA NEGOTIATIONS WAS COMING TO AN END, EASTERN REPRESENTATIVES WOULD LIKE ON THE PRESENT OCCASION TO STATE CLEARLY THEIR POSITION ON THIS ISSUE SO THAT THERE WOULD BE NO MISUNDERSTANDING ON IT.

9. KHLESTOV SAID THE EASTERN POSITION WAS THAT THE PRESENT NEGOTIATIONS WERE NOT US SOVIET BILATERAL NEGOTIATIONS ON THE REDUCTIONS OF FORCES. RATHER, THEY WERE MULTILATERAL NEGOTIATIONS ON THE REDUCTION OF FORCES. RATHER, THEY WERE MULTILATERAL NEGOTIATIONS ON THE REDUCTION OF ARMS AND ARMAMENTS IN CENTRAL EUROPE. THE DIRECT PARTICIPANTS IN THE NEGOTIATIONS WERE THOSE WITH FORCES OR TERRITORY IN THE AREA OF CENTRAL EUROPE. SO EASTERN REPS PROCEEDED FROM THE ASSUMPTION THAT DURING THE PRELIMINARY NEGOTIATIONS AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE COMMUNIQUE OF JUNE 28, 1973, THERE HAD BEEN ESTABLISHED TWO SEPARATE CATEGORIES, ONE OF DIRECT PARTICIPANTS, AND ONE OF PARTICIPANTS WITH SPECIAL STATUS. THIS WAS ONE OF THE BASES FOR THE EASTERN VIEW THAT ALL DIRECT PARTICIPANTS SHOULD PARTICIPATE IN REDUCTIONS. THE COMMUNIQUE DID NOT STATE, FOR EXAMPLE, THAT ONLY THE UNITED STATES AND SOVIET UNION SHOULD REDUCE THEIR FORCES. THEREFORE, THE EASTERN POSITION WAS A LOGICAL CONCLUSION FROM THE LANGUAGE OF THE COMMUNIQUE.

10. KHLESTOV CONTINUED THAT THIS WAS ONE ASPECT OF THE EASTERN APPROACH TO THE REDUCTION OF ARMS AND ARMAMENTS IN CENTRAL EUROPE. A SECOND MAJOR EASTERN CONSIDERATION WAS THAT ANY AGREEMENT ON THE REDUCTION OF ARMS AND ARMAMENTS IN CENTRAL EUROPE SHOULD BE WORKED OUT IN SUCH A WAY THAT THE AGREEMENT

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FULLY CORRESPONDED TO THE PRINCIPLE OF UNDIMINISHED SECURITY FOR ALL PARTICIPANTS. IT WOULD NOT BE POSSIBLE TO MEET THIS CRITERION IF SOME COUNTRIES REDUCED AND OTHERS DID NOT. THIS POINT WAS ALL THE MORE SIGNIFICANT IN THAT THE AGREED COMMUNIQUE STATED THAT REDUCTIONS SHOULD BE CARRIED OUT SO THAT THEY WOULD CORRESPOND AT EVERY POINT TO THE PRINCIPLE OF UNDIMINISHED SECURITY.

11. KHLESTOV SAID ANOTHER EASTERN CONSIDERATION WAS THAT BECAUSE ALL DIRECT PARTICIPANTS HAD EQUAL STATUS, THEY SHOULD UNDERTAKE EQUAL OBLIGATIONS TO REDUCE. FURTHER CONSIDERATIONS WERE BASED ON THE OBJECTIVE FACT OF THE STRUCTURE, ORGANIZATION AND COMPOSITION OF THE TWO ALLIANCES, NATO AND THE WARSAW PACT, WHICH HAD FORCES STATIONED IN CENTRAL EUROPE. EASTERN REPS HAD ALREADY POINTED OUT IN GREAT DETAIL THAT IT WAS NECESSARY TO ESTIMATE THE MILITARY POWER OF BOTH ALLIANCES BY TAKING THEM IN THEIR TOTALITY SINCE ALL THE FORCES ON BOTH SIDES WERE INTEGRATED INTO A SINGLE UNIFIED FORCE ON BOTH SIDES. EASTERN REPS HAD ALSO POINTED OUT THAT THE RATIO BETWEEN NATIONAL AND FOREIGN FORCES IN THE COMPOSITION OF THE OVERALL FORCES OF THE WARSAW PACT AND NATO DIFFERED. THEY HAD POINTED OUT, FOR EXAMPLE, THAT ACCORDING TO WESTERN FIGURES, US FORCES WERE ONLY 25 PERCENT OF NATO, WHEREAS THE SOVIET PROPORTION OF THE WARSAW PACT TOTAL WAS ROUGHLY 50 PERCENT OF THE TOTAL. FOR THIS REASON, EASTERN REPS BELIEVED THEY WERE JUSTIFIED IN STATING THAT THE EFFORT TO COVER ONLY US AND SOVIET FORCES IN REDUCTIONS WAS INEQUITABLE SINCE IT WOULD EXEMPT 75 PERCENT OF NATO STRENGTH FROM REDUCTIONS.

12. KHLESTOV SAID EASTERN REPS HAD CAREFULLY LISTENED TO AND ANALYZED THE ARGUMENTS ADVANCED BY WESTERN REPS IN SUPPORT OF THEIR POSITION THAT ONLY THE FORCES OF THE UNITED STATES AND SOVIET UNION SHOULD BE REDUCED FROM THE OUTSET. BUT WITH ALL DUE RESPECT TO HIS WESTERN COLLEAGUES AND THE QUALITY OF THEIR ARGUMENTS, EASTERN REPS HAD BEEN OBLIGED TO STATE THAT THIS APPROACH WAS AIMED AT CHANGING THE PRESENT RELATIONSHIP OF FORCES. HENCE, IT WAS INEQUITABLE BECAUSE IT WOULD RESULT IN UNILATERAL ADVANTAGE FOR THE

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S E C R E T SECTION 2 OF 6 MBFR VIENNA 0156

FROM US REP MBFR

NATO SIDE. IT WAS ONLY NATURAL THAT THE EAST COULD NOT ACCEPT SUCH AN APPROACH. CONSEQUENTLY, IT HAD BEEN THE EASTERN POSITION THAT IT WAS NECESSARY TO APPROACH THE SOLUTION OF THE QUESTION OF WHOSE FORCES SHOULD BE REDUCED FROM THE OUTSET IN A MORE EQUITABLE WAY, SO THAT A SOLUTION FULLY CORRESPONDED TO THE REQUIREMENT OF UNDIMINISHED SECURITY FOR ALL. EASTERN REPS BELIEVED THAT THE EASTERN REDUCTION PROGRAM FULLY CORRESPONDED TO THIS PRINCIPLE. MOREOVER, EASTERN APPROACH WAS CLEAR AND SPECIFIC ON ALL POINTS. IT STATED CLEARLY AND UNAMBIGUOUSLY THE OBLIGATIONS WHICH WERE TO BE ASSUMED FROM THE OUTSET AND THROUGHOUT THE REDUCTION PROCESS, AND DID SO RIGHT AT THE BEGINNING OF THAT PROCESS. IT CLEARLY STATED WHAT KIND OF OBLIGATIONS ALL PARTICIPANTS SHOULD ASSUME IN THE REDUCTION PROCESS. IT ONLY LEFT ONE QUESTION OPEN, THAT OF FURTHER REDUCTION STEPS TO BE TAKEN AFTER THE PROGRAM PROPOSED BY THE EAST HAD BEEN CARRIED

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OUT. (COMMENT: IT MAY BE THAT KHLESTOV WAS MENTIONING HERE THE POINT RAISED BY THE ROMANIANS, BULGARIANS AND HUNGARIANS IN THE COURSE OF THE VIENNA NEGOTIATIONS THAT IF THE PRESENT NEGOTIATIONS SUCCEEDED, THEY SHOULD BE FOLLOWED BY A FURTHER FORCE REDUCTION NEGOTIATION COVERING THE BALKANS. END COMMENT).

13. KHLESTOV CONTINUED THAT, THEREFORE, EASTERN REPS BELIEVED THAT THE EASTERN PLAN WAS PRECISE AND CLEAR ON ITS REDUCTION PROGRAM. IT PROVIDED THAT ALL DIRECT PARTICIPANTS SHOULD ASSUME EQUAL OBLIGATIONS. IT WAS EQUITABLE SINCE UNLIKE THE WESTERN PROPOSAL, THE EAST WAS NOT PROPOSING ANY SUGGESTED OBLIGATIONS THAT THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES WERE NOT WILLING TO ASSUME THEMSELVES. THE EAST WAS NOT MAKING A PROPOSAL DESIGNED TO OBTAIN UNILATERAL MILITARY ADVANTAGE FOR THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES. THE WESTERN PARTICIPANTS SHOULD ACT LIKEWISE AND NOT SEEK THE UNILATERAL MILITARY ADVANTAGES. SO IN CONSIDERING THE SUBJECT OF DISCUSSION NOW BEFORE THE GROUP OF WHOSE FORCES SHOULD BE REDUCED FROM THE OUTSET,

THE EAST BELIEVED AN EQUITABLE SOLUTION WOULD BE THAT THE FORCES OF ALL ELEVEN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS SHOULD BE REDUCED FROM THE OUTSET. KHLESTOV SAID HE HAD MADE A BRIEF GENERAL SUMMARY OF THE EASTERN POSITION TO MAKE IT CLEAR. HE WAS PREPARED IF NECESSARY TO ADD MORE TO DEFINE THE EASTERN POSITION.

14. NETHERLANDS REP SAID THAT ALLIED REPS HAD LISTENED WITH GREAT INTEREST TO KHLESTOV'S SUMMING UP OF WHERE PARTICIPANTS NOW STOOD ON THE AGREED QUESTION OF WHOSE FORCES SHOULD BE REDUCED FROM THE OUTSET. ALLIED REPS ALSO CONSIDERED IT WORTHWHILE TO MAKE A SUMMING UP OF THE SITUATION AND TO "TAKE A PHOTOGRAPH" OF WHERE PARTICIPANTS NOW STOOD. NETHERLANDS REP CONTINUED, USING THE TALKING POINTS APPROVED BY THE AD HOC GROUP, THAT, IN THEIR REMARKS ON THE PRESENT OCCASION, WESTERN REPS WOULD LIKE TO MAKE A SERIOUS ANALYTICAL EFFORT, WITH A CONSTRUCTIVE PURPOSE IN MIND, TO REVIEW THE STATUS OF THE QUESTION OF WHOSE FORCES SHOULD BE REDUCED FROM THE OUTSET. ALLIES REPS INTENDED IN THIS CONTEXT TO MAKE A SUGGESTION WHICH THEY CONSIDERED OF CONSIDERABLE IMPORTANCE.

15. NETHERLANDS REP SAID PARTICIPANTS IN THE INFORMAL SESSIONS HAD BEEN WORKING FOR SEVERAL MONTHS TO FIND AN ANSWER TO THE
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QUESTION WHICH THEY AGREED SHOULD BE THE FIRST PROBLEM THEY SHOULD TRY TO SOLVE, THE QUESTION OF WHOSE FORCES SHOULD BE REDUCED FROM THE OUTSET. PARTICIPANTS HAD NOT YET FOUND A COMMON SOLUTION TO THIS QUESTION, BUT WESTERN REPS BELIEVED THAT SOME MOVEMENT TOWARDS A SOLUTION HAD BEEN MADE. IN THIS SENSE, THEY BELIEVED IT MIGHT BE USEFUL IN THE PRESENT MEETING TO REVIEW AS OBJECTIVELY AS POSSIBLE WHERE BOTH SIDES NOW STAND IN THE EFFORT TO REACH MIDDLE GROUND ON THE AGREED QUESTION OF THOSE FORCES FROM THE OUTSET.

16. NETHERLANDS REP SAID THAT THE BASIC WESTERN POSITION HAS BEEN THAT THE US AND USSR SHOULD REDUCE IN THE FIRST PHASE OF THE NEGOTIATIONS, AND THAT REMAINING DIRECT PARTICIPANTS SHOULD NOT UNDERTAKE SPECIFIC OBLIGATIONS REGARDING THEIR FORCES IN A FIRST PHASE. REDUCTIONS BY REMAINING DIRECT PARTICIPANTS SHOULD BE NEGOTIATED IN A SECOND PHASE. WESTERN POSITION WAS NOW AS FOLLOWS:

17. THE US CONTINUED READY TO REDUCE IN A FIRST PHASE. AS REGARDS OTHER WESTERN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS, WHILE THEY REMAINED UNWILLING TO REDUCE THEIR FORCES IN A FIRST PHASE, THE ALLIES WERE READY TO UNDERTAKE SIGNIFICANT OBLIGATIONS REGARDING THEIR FORCES IN THE CONTEXT OF A SATISFACTORY FIRST PHASE AGREEMENT, WHICH WOULD INCLUDE AGREEMENT ON THE COMMON CEILING CONCEPT. THESE OBLIGATIONS WERE:

A. IN SUGGESTING THAT PARTICIPANTS MIGHT AGREE ON A SPECIFIC

LEVEL FOR THE GROUND FORCE MANPOWER OF BOTH SIDES, ALLIED HAD INDICATED THEIR READINESS TO ESTABLISH IN A FIRST PHASE AGREEMENT A COMMITMENT OF BOTH SIDES AS TO THE OVERALL NUMBER OF REDUCTIONS TO BE TAKEN IN BOTH PHASES OF NEGOTIATION.

B. ALLIES HAD SAID THAT THE WESTERN CONTRIBUTION TO SECOND PHASE REDUCTIONS WOULD FOCUS ON THE FORCES OF OTHER WESTERN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS.

C. ALLIES HAD SAID WE ARE READY TO WORK OUT WITH YOU THE TIME FOR THE BEGINNING OF THE SECOND PHASE OF NEGOTIATIONS.

D. ALLIES WERE READY TO ENTER ON A MUTUAL OBLIGATION NOT TO INCREASE THE OVERALL LEVEL OF GROUND FORCE MANPOWER ON BOTH SIDES BETWEEN THE PHASES.

E. ALLIES WERE READY TO WORK OUT A PROVISION IN A FIRST PHASE AGREEMENT FOR REVIEW OF THE SITUATION WITHIN A SPECIFIC PERIOD OF TIME, A PERIOD WHICH WOULD REPRESENT WHAT BOTH SIDES CONSIDERED A REASONABLE DURATION FOR A SECOND PHASE NEGOTIATION.

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F. ALLIES CONSIDERED THAT THESE MOVES PROVIDED REASONABLE ASSURANCE THAT REDUCTIONS BY OTHER WESTERN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS WILL, IN FACT, TAKE PLACE IN THE SECOND PHASE. THEY ALSO REPRESENTED SIGNIFICANT MOVEMENT TOWARDS THE MIDDLE GROUND, BUT IT WAS NOT ALLIED PURPOSE AT THE MOMENT TO ARGUE THEIR CASE. IT WAS JUST TO TAKE STOCK OF THE SITUATION AS IT NOW IS.

18. NETHERLANDS REP SAID THAT, AS AN AID TO UNDERSTANDING THE POSITIONS OF BOTH SIDES, HE WOULD NOW LIKE TO DESCRIBE WESTERN PERCEPTION OF EASTERN EFFORTS TO MOVE TOWARDS MIDDLE GROUND ON THE ISSUE OF WHOSE FORCES SHOULD BE REDUCED FROM THE OUTSET. THE BASIC EASTERN POSITION, SET FORTH IN THE DRAFT AGREEMENT OF NOVEMBER 8, 1973, HAD BEEN THAT ALL DIRECT PARTICIPANTS SHOULD REDUCE THEIR FORCES FROM THE OUTSET, WITH ALL REDUCTIONS TO BE SPECIFIED IN A SINGLE AGREEMENT. AT VARIOUS TIMES, DURING DISCUSSION OF THE QUESTION OF WHOSE FORCES SHOULD BE REDUCED FROM THE OUTSET, AND SUBJECT TO CERTAIN CONDITIONS WHICH HE WOULD NOT DESCRIBE IN DETAIL, EASTERN REPS HAD INFORMALLY SUGGESTED EAST MIGHT MOVE FROM THIS POSITION IN VARIOUS WAYS:

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FROM US REP MBFR

A. FIRST, IN THE CONTEXT OF EASTERN SYMBOLIC REDUCTION PROPOSAL AND OF EASTERN FIRST STEP PROPOSAL, EASTERN REPS HAD SUGGESTED THERE MIGHT BE TWO SEPARATE NEGOTIATIONS, AND THEY HAD SUGGESTED THAT THERE COULD BE A PROVISION IN THE FIRST AGREEMENT PROVIDING FOR CONTINUATION OF THE NEGOTIATIONS IN A SECOND NEGOTIATION.

B. IN THE CONTEXT OF EASTERN SYMBOLIC REDUCTION PROPOSAL, EAST HAD SUGGESTED THAT EACH SIDE COULD APPORTION REDUCTIONS AMONG ITS OWN MEMBERS ON THE UNDERSTANDING THAT ALL WOULD REDUCE AND THAT REDUCTIONS WOULD NOT ESTABLISH NATIONAL SUB-CEILINGS.

C. IN THE CONTEXT OF EASTERN FIRST STEP PROPOSAL, EAST HAD SUGGESTED THAT THE BULK OF REDUCTIONS IN THE FIRST STEP MIGHT BE TAKEN BY THE US AND USSR.

D. EAST HAD IN THE CONTEXT OF EASTERN FIRST STEP PROPOSAL SUGGESTED STAGED IMPLEMENTATION OF A FIRST REDUCTION AGREEMENT, WITH REDUCTIONS BY THE US AND SOVIET UNION AND PERHAPS SOME OTHERS STARTING FIRST, AND REDUCTIONS BY THE REMAINDER STARTING LATER IN SECRET

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THE FIRST STEP.

E. EAST HAD MENTIONED THAT IT MIGHT BE A THEORETICAL SOLUTION TO DEFER REDUCTIONS BY A NUMBER OF DIRECT PARTICIPANTS OTHER THAN THE US AND THE USSR TO A SECOND NEGOTIATION.

19. NETHERLANDS REP SAID EASTERN REPS SHOULD BEAR IN MIND THAT

WESTERN REPS HAD NOT SOUGHT TO DESCRIBE THE CONDITIONS OR THE FRAME-
WORK WHICH EAST HAD ADVANCED ALONG WITH THESE POINTS, JUST AS HE
HAD NOT SPECIFIED CERTAIN CONDITIONS OR EXPECTATIONS WESTERN REPS
HAD RAISED IN CONJUNCTION WITH THEIR OWN PROPOSALS. AT THIS POINT,
ALLIED REPS WERE INTERESTED ONLY IN REVIEWING THE PROPOSALS OF
BOTH SIDES BEARING DIRECTLY ON THE QUESTION OF WHOSE FORCES SHOULD
BE REDUCED FROM THE OUTSET, AND NOT THE BACKGROUND OF THESE
PROPOSALS, EVEN THOUGH ALLIED REPS REALIZED THIS BACKGROUND
WAS IMPORTANT FOR BOTH SIDES. EAST HAD PRESENTED THESE SUG-
GESTIONS AS REFLECTING SOME DEGREE OF MOVEMENT TOWARDS THE MIDDLE
GROUND ON THE AGREED ISSUE OF WHOSE FORCES SHOULD REDUCE FROM THE
OUTSET. IT WAS CLEAR TO EAST THAT WEST DID NOT CONSIDER THESE
MOVES TO BE SUFFICIENT. HOWEVER, IT WAS NOT PRESENT PURPOSE OF ALLIED
REPS TO EVALUATE THESE MOVES, BUT RATHER TO DETERMINE WHERE BOTH
SIDES NOW STAND.

20. NETHERLANDS REP CONTINUED THAT, AS WESTERN REPS
ANALYZED THE PRESENT SITUATION, THEY FOUND THAT THE REMAINING AREA
OF DIFFERENCE OR "GAP" BETWEEN THE POSITIONS OF BOTH SIDES HAS
NARROWED, AND NOW CENTERS ON THE NATURE OF THE OBLIGATIONS WHICH
REMAINING DIRECT PARTICIPANTS WOULD BE WILLING TO UNDERTAKE IN
A FIRST AGREEMENT. IN PARTICULAR, IT HAS FOCUSED ON REPEATED
EASTERN STATEMENTS THAT, ALTHOUGH THE WEST HAD MODIFIED ITS ORIGINAL
POSITION, THE REMAINING WESTERN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS WERE STILL
UNWILLING TO UNDERTAKE AN OBLIGATION TO REDUCE THEIR FORCES. FOR
EXAMPLE, IN THE JUNE 25 SESSION,
AMBASSADOR KHESTOV HAD ARGUED THAT A NO-INCREASE OBLIGATION WAS
NOT AN OBLIGATION TO REDUCE FROM THE OUTSET. HE ASSERTED THAT
THE REMAINING WESTERN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS WERE ATTEMPTING SOMEHOW TO
EVADE THE OBLIGATION TO REDUCE. HE WENT ON TO SAY THAT, IF THE
ALLIED REPRESENTATIVES HAD CHANGED THEIR BASIC PLAN AND WERE NOW
WILLING TO COMMIT THE REMAINING DIRECT PARTICIPANTS TO REDUCE THEIR
FORCES, THIS WOULD BE SOMETHING DIFFERENT. FOR THEIR PART, ALLIES
HAD STATED THAT WE WERE WILLING TO CONSIDER VARIANTS, BUT THAT,
FOR REASONS WHICH THEY HAVE MADE CLEAR AND, TO WHICH THEY CONTIN-
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UED TO ATTACH GREAT WEIGHT, THE REMAINING WESTERN DIRECT
PARTICIPANTS WERE NOT PREPARED TO REDUCE THEIR FORCES IN A FIRST
PHASE OR STEP. THIS REMAINED A CENTRAL POINT IN WESTERN POSITION.

21. NETHERLANDS REP CONTINUED THAT, HOWEVER, IN VIEW OF THE DESIRE
OF BOTH SIDES TO REACH TENTATIVE AGREEMENT ON THE QUESTION OF WHOSE
FORCES SHOULD BE REDUCED FROM THE OUTSET, WHICH WOULD BE A FIRST
UNDERSTANDING IN THESE NEGOTIATIONS AND AN IMPORTANT STEP
TOWARDS RESOLUTION OF OTHER QUESTIONS, WEST DECIDED TO TAKE THE
INITIATIVE FOR A FINAL STEP TO REACH AN AGREED ANSWER TO THIS
QUESTION.

22. NETHERLANDS REP WENT ON: "THEREFORE, WITH REGARD TO YOUR

QUESTIONS WHETHER THE REMAINING WESTERN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS WOULD REDUCE THEIR FORCES, WE NOW WISH TO TELL YOU THAT THE ALLIES ARE WILLING TO CONSIDER A COMMITMENT TO THE EFFECT THAT THE WESTERN CONTRIBUTION TO SECOND PHASE REDUCTIONS TO AN AGREED COMMON CEILING ON OVERALL GROUND FORCE MANPOWER OF EACH SIDE WOULD INCLUDE REDUCTIONS IN THE GROUND FORCES IN THE AREA OF ALL NON-US WESTERN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS. THE ALLIES COULD UNDERTAKE SUCH A COMMITMENT ONLY IN THE EVENT OF A SATISFACTORY FIRST PHASE AGREEMENT. THE ONLY EXCEPTION IS THE FORCES OF LUXEMBOURG. YOU HAVE ALREADY INFORMALLY INDICATED THAT YOU WOULD NOT EXPECT LUXEMBOURG TO REDUCE ITS FORCES, SO WE ASSUME THAT THIS POINT WILL GIVE RISE TO NO DIFFICULTY" (END QUOTE)

23. NETHERLANDS REP SAID HE WISHED TO STRESS THE IMPORTANCE OF THE STEP WEST WAS TAKING. ORIGINAL WESTERN POSITION WAS THAT THE REMAINING WESTERN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS SHOULD NOT UNDERTAKE SPECIFIC OBLIGATIONS CONCERNING THEIR FORCES IN A FIRST AGREEMENT. IN THE EFFORT TO REACH A MIDDLE GROUND SOLUTION ON THE QUESTION OF WHOSE FORCES SHOULD BE REDUCED FROM THE OUTSET, WEST HAD DEPARTED FROM THAT POSITION.

24. WESTERN REPS HAD SAID THAT, IN CONNECTION WITH A FIRST PHASE AGREEMENT, THEY WOULD BE WILLING TO SPECIFY WHEN THE SECOND PHASE NEGOTIATIONS WOULD BEGIN, AGREE ON THE TOTAL NUMBER OF REDUCTIONS TO BE TAKEN IN THAT.

25. EASTERN REPS FOLLOWED NETHERLANDS REP'S PRESENTATION WITH CLOSE ATTENTION, TAKING FULL NOTES. WHEN NETHERLANDS
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REP HAD COMPLETED PRESENTATION, KHLESTOV REQUESTED PAUSE TO PERMIT THE EAST TO CAUCUS.

26. AFTER PROCEEDINGS WERE RESUMED, UK REP IN FURTHER EFFORT TO HEAD OFF SUPERDICIAL DEFENSIVE STATEMENTS BY EAST WHICH EAST MIGHT LATER FEEL COMPELLED TO ABIDE BY, SAID THAT, IN NETHERLANDS REP'S STATEMENT THE ALLIES HAD PUT FORWARD A MAJOR AND SUBSTANTIAL NEW STEP INTENDED AS A FINAL EFFORT TO REACH AGREEMENT ON THE QUESTION OF WHOSE FORCES SHOULD BE REDUCED FROM THE OUTSET. ALLIED REPS HOPED VERY MUCH THAT EASTERN REPS WOULD GIVE SERIOUS AND DELIBERATE CONSIDERATION TO THIS PROPOSAL SINCE ALLIED REPS REGARDED IT AS A VERY IMPORTANT MOVE. EASTERN REPS WOULD, HE KNEW, HAVE COMMENTS ON THIS PROPOSAL WHICH THEY WOULD WISH TO MAKE. ALLIES REPS WOULD LISTEN SERIOUSLY TO SUCH COMMENTS AND TAKE THEM INTO CONSIDERATION. HOWEVER, HE WOULD LIKE TO SUGGEST IN ALL SERIOUSNESS THAT IN VIEW OF THE IMPORTANCE OF THE ALLIED PROPOSAL, IT MIGHT BE WISE TO DEFER DISCUSSION OF IT UNTIL THE NEXT SESSION WHEN EAST WOULD HAVE HAD AN OPPORTUNITY TO REFLECT ON WHAT

WESTERN REPS HAD SAID ON THE PRESENT OCCASION.

27. SMIRNOVSKY MADE A SARCASTIC REMARK ABOUT THE ALLIES
HAVING EMPHASIZED SO MUCH THAT THE ALL-PARTICIPANTS COMMIT-
MENT WAS A "FINAL STEP." KHLESTOV THEN SAID THAT IN VIEW OF NETHER-
LANDS REP'S PRESENTATION AND TAKING INTO ACCOUNT WHAT

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FROM US REP MBFR

HAD BEEN SAID BY UK REP, HE WOULD LIKE TO MAKE FOLLOWING
POINTS FIRST, HE WANTED TO EMPHASIZE THAT EAST REGARDED
WITH UTMOST SERIOUSNESS BOTH WHAT ALLIES HAD JUST SAID
THEMSELVES AND ALSO WHAT EASTERN REPS WERE ABOUT TO SAY ABOUT
THE ALLIED PRESENTATION. THE EASTERN REACTION WOULD NOT
BE HASTY BUT WAS THE RESULT OF DELIBERATE CONSIDERATION.
HIS FIRST REMARK DEALT WITH THE SUMMING UP JUST MADE BY
NETHERLANDS REP ON THE SITUATION IN PRESENT ROUND. EASTERN
REPS HAD THE IMPRESSION THAT A PORTION OF THE SUMMING UP
BY THE NETHERLANDS REP, SPECIFICALLY, HIS REVIEW OF SOME OF

THE SUGGESTIONS MADE BY EAST IN THE PRESENT ROUND OF THE TALKS, DID NOT SUM UP THE SITUATION QUITE AS THE EAST UNDERSTOOD IT. IN OTHER WORDS, SOME EVALUATIONS AND PORTIONS OF THE SUMMING UP BY THE NETHERLANDS REP IN THE EASTERN VIEW DID NOT PRECISELY REFLECT THE REAL STATE OF AFFAIRS ON SOME SPECIFIC POINTS. HE WOULD NOT COMMENT ON ALL ASPECTS

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OF REMARKS MADE BY NETHERLANDS REP, WHICH EAST BELIEVED DID NOT PRECISELY REFLECT THE REAL STATE OF AFFAIRS. BUT HE DID WISH TO COMMENT ON SOME ASPECTS OF THIS SUMMING UP. THE POINT WAS THAT SINCE PARTICIPANTS WERE GOING TO LEAVE VIENNA SOON FOR A BREAK, IF THEY DID NOT HAVE A PRECISE UNDERSTANDING OF THE POSITIONS OF EACH SIDE, THIS COULD LEAD TO MISUNDERSTANDINGS IN THE FUTURE AND IT WAS IMPORTANT TO AVOID THIS.

28. KHESTOV SAID THE FIRST POINT HE WISHED TO MAKE IN THIS REGARD WAS THAT HE BELIEVED THERE WAS A GENERAL UNDERSTANDING THAT THESE INFORMAL SESSIONS WERE MEETINGS AT WHICH AN EXCHANGE OF VIEWS AND SUGGESTIONS TOOK PLACE. IT WAS NOT ALWAYS THE CASE THAT OFFICIAL AND FORMAL PROPOSALS WERE MADE. THEREFORE, WHEN NETHERLANDS REP REFERRED TO THE PROPOSALS OF THE SOCIALIST DELEGATIONS, THIS TERMINOLOGY WAS NOT EXACTLY CORRECT. IN THE INFORMAL SESSIONS, AN INFORMAL EXCHANGE OF IDEAS TOOK PLACE IN ORDER TO FIND SOLUTIONS. ALL PARTICIPANTS SHOULD UNDERSTAND THIS METHOD, WHICH HAD BEEN USED IN THE PRELIMINARY CONSULTATIONS AND IN THE NEGOTIATIONS PROPER. THEREFORE, WHEN WESTERN REPS SUMMARIZED IDEAS AND SUGGESTIONS MENTIONED HERE AS FORMAL PROPOSALS, THIS WAS NOT A CORRECT UNDERSTANDING OF THE NATURE AND STATUS OF THESE IDEAS. SO HE WISHED TO EMPHASIZE ONCE AGAIN THAT IN THESE INFORMAL SESSIONS, PARTICIPANTS WERE ENGAGED IN THE EFFORT TO HAVE AN INFORMAL EXCHANGE OF IDEAS. NETHERLANDS REP'S SUMMARY HAD BEEN PRESENTED IN TERMS WHICH CREATED THE IMPRESSION THAT ALLIED UNDERSTANDING OF THE SITUATION WAS NOT THE SAME AS THE EASTERN UNDERSTANDING.

29. KHESTOV SAID NETHERLANDS REP'S POINTS SETTING FORTH IN SEQUENCE THE EASTERN POSITION ON THE QUESTION OF WHOSE FORCES SHOULD BE REDUCED FROM THE OUTSET DID NOT REFLECT THE EASTERN POSITION AS EASTERN REPS UNDERSTOOD IT. HE WOULD LIKE TO EMPHASIZE THAT, IN THE COURSE OF THESE SESSIONS, WHEN EAST MENTIONED CERTAIN IDEAS ON THE QUESTION OF WHOSE FORCES SHOULD BE REDUCED FROM THE OUTSET, EASTERN REPS HAD SAID THAT IT MIGHT BE POSSIBLE TO CONSIDER CERTAIN VARIANTS. THEY HAD EXPRESSED WILLINGNESS TO CONSIDER VARIOUS VARIANTS IN ORDER TO HELP FIND AN AGREEMENT ON AN INITIAL REDUCTION

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STEP. EASTERN REPS HAD ALSO MADE IT CLEAR THAT THEY WERE ACTING ON THE ASSUMPTION THAT FOR THE PURPOSES OF SUCH AN INITIAL STEP, IT WAS NECESSARY TO TAKE INTO ACCOUNT SOME ASPECTS OF THE WESTERN POSITION AND THAT EAST WAS WILLING TO CONSIDER WESTERN INTERESTS. IN OTHER WORDS, EASTERN REPS HAD EXPRESSED THEIR READINESS TO SEEK A MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE SOLUTION TAKING INTO ACCOUNT WESTERN PROPOSALS BUT NOT INSISTING THAT THE EASTERN PROPOSAL BE THE BASIS FOR AGREEMENT. THIS HAD ALL BEEN DONE IN THE CONTEXT OF EFFORTS TO DEFINE A FIRST REDUCTION STEP. AND EASTERN REPS HAD EXPLAINED AT GREAT LENGTH WHAT THEY HAD IN MIND WITH THIS STEP. SO HE DID NOT BELIEVE IT WOULD BE A PRECISE EVALUATION OF THE INFORMAL SESSIONS TO MAKE SUCH A FAR-REACHING SUMMING UP AS NETHERLANDS REP HAD DONE AS REGARDS INFORMAL EASTERN REMARKS DURING THE SESSIONS.

30. KHESTOV WENT ON TO SAY THAT THESE EASTERN REMARKS HAD BEEN MADE IN THE CONTEXT OF DEALING WITH A FIRST REDUCTION STEP. THEY SHOULD NOT BE ALLIED TO CONSIDERATION OF THE GENERAL REDUCTION PLANS OF BOTH SIDES. THE EAST WANTED A CLEAR WESTERN UNDERSTANDING OF THIS POINT. EASTERN REPS BELIEVED THAT SOME OF THE EFFORTS MENTIONED BY NETHERLANDS REP DID NOT CLEARLY REFLECT WHAT EASTERN REPS HAD HAD IN MIND IN EXPRESSING SOME OF THEIR IDEAS. ONE SUCH ASPECT WAS NETHERLANDS REP'S ASSERTION THAT EAST HAD MENTIONED A THEORETICAL POSSIBILITY OF DIFFERING REDUCTIONS OF ARMED FORCES AND ARMAMENTS OF THE OTHER DIRECT PARTICIPANTS TO A SECOND PHASE OF NEGOTIATION. HE WOULD LIKE TO EMPHASIZE THAT EXCHANGE OF REMARKS WAS ONE THING, BUT WHEN EFFORTS WERE MADE TO SUMMARIZE THEM THIS WAS ANOTHER THING. EAST REPS DID NOT INTEND TO ACCUSE ALLIED REPS OF INCORRECTLY REFLECTING WHAT EAST HAD SAID. THIS WAS NOT THE POINT. WHEN ALLIED REPS GATHERED TOGETHER INDIVIDUAL POINTS AND SUMMARIZED THEM, THEN THIS WAS SOMETHING DIFFERENT FROM WHAT THE EAST SAID AND DID NOT FLOW FROM THE REMARKS MADE BY EASTERN REPS. IT WAS A FACT THAT ALLIED REPS HAD TRIED TO MAKE A SUMMARY AND IN IT THEY HAD SAID THAT EAST COULD DEFER REDUCTIONS BY THE REMAINING DIRECT PARTICIPANTS OTHER THAN US AND USSR. AFTER HEARING WHAT WEST HAD SAID AND SUMMARIZED, IT WAS NECESSARY TO MAKE EASTERN POSITION CLEAR. TAKE FOR EXAMPLE THE QUESTION

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OF THE COMMON CEILING. WHEN EASTERN REPS HAD DEALT WITH THE QUESTION OF A FIRST REDUCTION STEP, THEY HAD NOTED THAT

THE WEST HAD SOME DIFFICULTIES WITH THE QUESTION OF NATIONAL
CEILINGS IF A FIRST REDUCTION STEP WERE TO BE TAKEN.
ON THE UNDERSTANDING THAT PARTICIPANTS WERE WILLING TO
ENGAGE IN SEARCHING FOR A FIRST STEP, IF SOME DIFFICULTIES
DEVELOPED IN THIS REGARD,

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L-03 NSAE-00 OIC-04 OMB-01 PA-04 PM-07 PRS-01 SAJ-01

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DRC-01 /152 W

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P R 111850Z JUL 74

FM USDEL MBFR VIENNA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0288

SECDEF WASHDC PRIOTIY

INFO USMISSION NATO PRIORITY

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AMEMBASSY LONDON

USNMR SHAPE

USCINCEUR

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FROM US REP MBFR

EASTERN REPS WERE PREPARED TO TRY TO OVERCOME THEM. BUT THE PRESENT
SUMMARY BY NETHERLANDS REP EASTERN REPS GAVE THE IMPRESSION THAT
WEST BELIEVED EAST AGREED WITH THE COMMON CEILING, IN CONNECTION WITH
NETHERLANDS REP'S REMARKS ON AVOIDANCE OF NATIONAL SUB-
CEILING. BUT THIS WAS NOT THE CASE.

31. KHLESTOV SAID ANOTHER ASPECT OF NETHERLANDS REP SUMMARY HAD
BEEN WHEN LATTER HAD SAID THAT IF REDUCTIONS WERE TO BE CARRIED OUT
ON BOTH SIDES THE AMOUNT SPECIFIED WOULD BE DISTRIBUTED BY EACH
SIDE ON ITS OWN. SMIRNOVSKY INTERJECTED TO SAY THAT THIS WAS

NOT THE CASE AND THAT IT WAS IMPORTANT THAT ALLIED REPS NOTE THIS POINT. KHESTOV CONTINUED THAT EASTERN REPS BELIEVED IT WAS NECESSARY FOR WEST TO HAVE CLEAR UNDERSTANDING THAT THE SUMMING UP OF NETHERLANDS REP WOULD NOT REFLECT EASTERN POSITION EXACTLY. HE WOULD NOT COMMENT ON ALL THE POINTS RAISED BY NETHERLANDS REP ON THE PRESENT OCCASION, IF NECESSARY HE WOULD
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COME BACK TO THE POINT AT A LATER TIME.

32. NETHERLANDS REP SAID HE WOULD LIKE TO GIVE A SHORT REPLY TO KHESTOV'S ARGUMENTS. IN THE SUMMARY OF THE EASTERN POSITION HE HAD JUST PRESENTED EACH POINT ASCRIBED TO THE EAST WAS CLEARLY CLARIFIED BY STATING THE CONTEXT IN WHICH IT HAD BEEN ADVANCED. ALLIED REPS WERE CLEARLY AWARE THAT THESE IDEAS WERE WITHOUT STATUS AND WERE SO TO SPEAK STRAWS IN THE WIND. ON EACH POINT, ALLIES HAD TRIED TO STATE IN WHAT CONTEXT THE SUGGESTION HAD BEEN MADE, EITHER OF THE EASTERN SYMBOLIC REDUCTION PROPOSALS OR THE FIRST STEP PROPOSAL. THE ALLIED REP HAD BEEN SCRUPULOUS ON THIS POINT. ALLIED REP HAD TRIED TO BRING TOGETHER THESE INDIVIDUAL POINTS IN THE EFFORT TO FIND A WAY TO AN AGREED MIDDLE GROUND SOLUTION OF THE QUESTION OF WHOSE FORCES SHOULD BE REDUCED FROM THE OUTSET. NETHERLANDS REP K THEN REREAD THE TALKING POINTS WITH WHICH HE HAD SUMMARIZED THE EASTERN PROPOSALS AS FOLLOWS:

" PLEASE BEAR IN MIND THAT WE HAVE NOT SOUGHT TO DESCRIBE THE CONDITIONS OR THE FRAMEWORK WHICH YOU HAVE ADVANCED ALONG THESE POINTS, JUST AS I HAVE NOT RAISED IN CONJUNCTION WITH OUR OWN PROPOSALS. AT THIS POINT, WE ARE ONLY INTERESTED IN REVIEWING THE PROPOSALS OF BOTH SIDES BEARING DIRECTLY ON THE QUESTION OF WHOSE FORCES SHOULD BE REDUCED FROM THE OUTSET, AND NOT THE BACKGROUND OF THESE PROPOSALS, EVEN THOUGH WE REALIZE THIS BACKGROUND IS IMPORTANT FOR BOTH SIDES."

33. NETHERLANDS REP SAID THIS MADE QUITE CLEAR THAT ALLIES HAD PLACED THESE "STRAWS" IN THE CONTEXT IN WHICH THEY HAD JUST BEEN MADE ORIGINALLY. ALLIED REPS HAD AT NO TIME IMPLIED EASTERN ACCEPTANCE OF THE COMMON CEILING. THEY HAD MERELY NOTED THAT, ONE POINT, EAST HAD SUGGESTED-- AND THIS HAD BEEN MERELY A SUGGESTION AND NOT A COMMITMENT--THAT EACH SIDE COULD DISTRIBUTE ITS OWN REDUCTIONS WITHOUT SUB-CEILINGS. THIS HAD BEEN SUGGESTED WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE SYMBOLIC REDUCTION PROPOSAL. IN COMPILING THEIR PRESENT SUMMARY, ALLIES HAD THOUGHT THIS POINT OF INTEREST AND HAD TAKEN IT UP. AMONG POINTS EAST HAD INFORMALLY SUGGESTED, EAST HAD ALSO INDICATED THEY MIGHT DEFER REDUCTIONS BY SOME PARTICIPANTS TO THE SECOND PHASE OF NEGOTIATION. NETHERLANDS REP SAID THAT, SINCE IT WAS CLEAR THAT HIS REMARKS ON THE SUBJECT HAD BEEN MISUNDERSTOOD, TO THE EFFECT THAT THE EAST
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APPARENTLY BELIEVED ALLIED REPS WERE CLAIMING THAT EAST WAS WILLING TO POSTPONE REDUCTIONS BY ALL DIRECT PARTICIPANTS OTHER THAN US AND USSR TO A SECOND PHASE OF NEGOTIATIONS, AND EAST APPARENTLY HAD NOT CLEARLY UNDERSTOOD HIS FORMULATION THE FIRST TIME IT WAS USED, HE WISHED TO REPEAT IT AS FOLLOWS:

"YOU HAVE MENTIONED THAT IT MIGHT BE A THEORETICAL SOLUTION TO DEFER REDUCTIONS BY A NUMBER OF DIRECT PARTICIPANTS OTHER THAN THE USA AND THE USSR TO A SECOND NEGOTIATION.""

34. NETHERLANDS REP SAID HE WISHED TO POINT OUT THAT AN EFFORT TO COMPARE INFORMAL SUGGESTIONS MADE BY BOTH SIDES WAS A LEGITIMATE PRACTICE AND ON THE PART OF THE ALLIES HAD BEEN INTENDED AS A CONSTRUCTIVE EFFORT TO FIND THE ELUSIVE MIDDLE GROUND ON THE QUESTION OF WHOSE FORCES SHOULD BE REDUCED FROM THE OUTSET AND TO MAKE THE ISSUE MORE CONCRETE. ALLIED EFFORT HAD NOT BEEN INTENDED TO FORMALIZE QUESTIONS OR SUGGESTIONS OR TO CONFIRM THEM INTO COMMITMENTS.

35. KHLESTOV SAID HE WOULD LIKE TO REPEAT EASTERN POSITION SO THAT ALL PARTICIPANTS WOULD HAVE FULL UNDERSTANDING OF THE ISSUE. WHEN EAST SOUGHT SOLUTIONS, IDEAS AND SUGGESTIONS WERE EXPRESSED. BUT THEY COULD NOT BE TAKEN OUT OF CONTEXT AND MADE MORE GENERAL. IN THE EFFORT TO FIND A SOLUTION OF A SPECIFIC QUESTION, EAST HAD MADE SOME REMARKS, BUT WHAT WEST HAD TRIED TO SUM UP LOOKED

DIFFERENT FROM WHAT EAST HAD HAD IN MIND AT THE TIME EASTERN REPS MERELY HAD WANTED TO WARN WESTERN REPS IN ADVANCE SO THAT ALL PARTICIPANTS WOULD HAVE A CORRECT EVALUATION OF THESE NEGOTIATIONS, SINCE EAST INTENDED TO PURSUE THEM. WHAT EAST HAD HEARD ON PRESENT OCCASION DID NOT QUITE REFLECT EASTERN INTENT. HE SIMPLY WISHED WESTERN REPS TO HAVE A CLEAR UNDERSTANDING OF EASTERN POSITION. WESTERN REPS HAD EXPRESSED SOME IDEAS ON HOW TO MOVE TO A SOLUTION. EASTERN REPS HAD DONE SO ALSO, BUT ALL SHOULD HAVE A CLEAR UNDERSTANDING OF THE RESPECTIVE POSITIONS. WESTERN SUMMARY DID NOT CLEARLY REFLECT EASTERN POSITION, SO IT SEEMED TO HIM THAT IT WOULD BE APPROPRIATE TO BE REALISTIC ABOUT THIS FACT, RATHER THAN TO PROCEED ON THE BASIS OF AN EVALUATION WHICH WAS NOT QUITE PRECISE. HE WOULD NOT PURSUE THE MATTER FURTHER SINCE IT WAS CLEAR THAT ALLIED REPS UNDERSTOOD EASTERN POINT.

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36. KHLESTOV CONTINUED THAT, AS REGARDS THE SECOND ISSUE BROUGHT UP BY NETHERLANDS REP, NETHERLANDS AND UK REPS HAD EMPHASIZED

THAT WEST HAD MADE MAJOR NEW MOVE WHICH DESERVED SERIOUS CONSIDERATION BY EAST. WHAT NETHERLANDS REP HAD STATED IN THE NAME OF WESTERN REPS WAS THAT THE REMAINING WESTERN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS WERE NOW PREPARED TO CONSIDER A COMMITMENT THAT ALL REMAINING DIRECT WESTERN PARTICIPANTS EXCEPT THE US AND LUXEMBOURG WOULD BE PREPARED TO CONSIDER REDUCTION OF THEIR FORCES IN A SECOND STAGE. THIS WAS AN ADDITION TO THE WESTERN OVERALL REDUCTION SCHEME AS REGARDS WHAT MIGHT TAKE PLACE IN THE SECOND STAGE AFTER THE FIRST WAS COMPLETED.

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INFO OCT-01 EUR-25 AEC-11 CIAE-00 H-03 INR-10 IO-14 L-03

NSAE-00 OIC-04 OMB-01 PA-04 PM-07 PRS-01 SAJ-01

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FM USDEL MBFR VIENNA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0289

SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY

INFO USMISSION NATO PRIORITY

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AMEMBASSY LONDON

USNMR SHAPE

USCINCEUR

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FROM US REP MBFR

37. KHLESTOV SAID THE SOCIALIST REPS HAD ALREADY HAD A SERIOUS EXCHANGE OF VIEWS ON THIS TOPIC AFTER HEARING THIS PROPOSAL AND HE NOW WISHED TO GIVE THEIR REACTION. THE FIRST POINT HE WISHED TO MAKE WAS THAT, ONCE AGAIN, THIS POINT HAD BEEN PROPOSED WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE EXISTING OVERALL WESTERN REDUCTION PLAN. THAT IS TO SAY THAT IN MAKING THIS PROPOSAL, WESTERN REPS WERE STILL PROPOSING THAT THE UNITED STATES

AND SOVIETS SHOULD BE THE FIRST TO REDUCE, AND THAT THE REMAINING PARTICIPANTS WOULD TAKE REDUCTIONS AT A SECOND STAGE. TO BE MORE EXACT, CONSIDERATION OF REDUCTIONS BY REMAINING DIRECT PARTICIPANTS WOULD BE DEFERRED TO A SECOND PHASE. IN OTHER WORDS, THE ORIGINAL WESTERN PLAN STILL PROVIDED FOR TWO PHASES OF NEGOTIATION ON REDUCTION. THE ORIGINAL PLAN WAS THAT ONLY TWO DIRECT PARTICIPANTS SHOULD REDUCE AT THE OUTSET. WHAT ALLIED REPS HAD JUST SUGGESTED DID NOT IN ANY WAY CHANGE THE ORIGINAL WESTERN PLAN.

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38. KHLESTOV SAID A SECOND ISSUE CONCERNED A POINT AGAIN RAISED BY THE ALLIES DURING THE SUMMING UP OF THEIR WON POSITION EARLIER ON THE PRESENT OCCASION. IN PRESENTING THIS SUMMARY OF THE WESTER POSITION, NETHERLANDS REP HAD SAID THAT ALLIES HAD EARLIER SUGGESTED THAT A SECOND PHASE OF NEGOTIATIONS WOULD FOCUS ON REDUCTIONS BY THE REMAINING WESTERN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS. THIS ALREADY IMPLIED THAT NOT ALL OF THE WESTERN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS WOULD REDUCE THEIR FORCES IN A SECOND PHASE. NOW WESTERN REPS HAD ADDED LUXEMBOURG TO THE UNITED STATES AS A DIRECT PARTICIPANT COUNTRY WHICH WOULD NOT REDUCE IN A SECOND PHASE. THUS THE ORIGINAL "FOCUS" FORMULA CONTAINED THE SAME IDEA AS THE PRESENT ALLIED SUGGESTION. IN ALLIED REPS ADVANCING THEIR ORIGINAL FORMULA, ALLIED REPS HAD ALREADY IMPOED THAT THE US WOULD BE EXEMPTED FROM REDUCTIONS IN THE SECOND PHASE. NOW, ALLIED REPS HAD ADDED THE POINT THAT ALL DIRECT PARTICIPANTS EXCEPT THE US AND NOW LUXEMBOURG WOULD BE COVERED BY REDUCTIONS IN THE SECOND PHASE. WITH ALL DUE RESPECT TO LUXEMBOURG, EASTERN REPS CONSIDERED THAT THE SIZE OF THE LUXEMBOURG ARMED FORCES WOULD NOT BE A DECISIVE ELEMENT IN SOLVING THE QUESTION OF THE REDUCTION OF ARMED FORCES AND ARMAMENTS IN CENTRAL EUROPE. WHEN ALLIED REPS HAD MADE THEIR MOST RECENT MOVE AND HAD APPEALED TO EAST TO GIVE SERIOUS CONSIDERATION TO IT, EASTERN REPS HAD TRIED TO SEE WHAT THE DIFFERENCE WAS BETWEEN THE PAST WESTERN POSITION AND THE PRESENT MOVE. BASED ON THE ORIGINAL ALLIED FORMULATION AND WHAT HAD BEEN SUGGESTED ON THE PRESENT OCCASION, THE US WOULD NOT BE SUBJECTED TO REDUCTIONS IN THE SECOND PHASE OF NEGOTIATIONS.

39. KHLESTOV SAID THE ALLIES MIGHT HAVE USED DIFFERENT LANGUAGE ON THE PRESENT OCCASION, BUT THE EFFECT WAS THE SAME AS BEFORE. PREVIOUSLY, WESTERN REPS HAD SAID THE WESTERN CONTRIBUTION TO SECOND PHASE REDUCTIONS WOULD BE FOCUSED ON THE FORCES OF THE REMAINING WESTERN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS. NOW, ALLIES HAD ADDED LUXEMBOURG TO THE LIST OF THOSE EXEMPTED FROM REDUCETIONS IN A SECOND PHASE. THIS WAS NOT A VERY SIGNIFICANT MOVE, AND HE KNEW ALLIED REPS WOULD BE AWARE OF THIS. NATURALLY, ANYONE HAD THE FREEDOM

TO RESORT TO DIFFERENT LANGUAGE, BUT THIS DID NOT CHANGE
SUBSTANCE. SINCE PARTICIPANTS WERE DEALING WITH THE QUESTION
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OF REDUCTION OF ARMED FORCES AND ARMAMENTS IN CENTRAL
EUROPE, IT WAS CLEAR THAT IT WAS NOT THE ARMED FORCES OF
LUXEMBOURG WHICH WERE THE BACKBONE OF THE NATO MILITARY
POSITION. WHOEVER MADE A REALISTIC ANALYSIS UNDERSTOOD
WHOSE FORCES ON THE WESTERN SIDE DID MAKE UP THE BACKBONE
OF NATO. HE HOPED THAT WESTERN REPS DID NOT CONSIDER THE
EAST SO NAIVE THAT THE EAST WOULD MAKE AN INTENSIVE EFFORT
TO REDUCE THE FORCES OF LUXEMBOURG. SO WITH ALL DUE RESPECT
HE DID NOT SEE ANY PRACTICAL DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE ORIGINAL
WESTERN PROPOSAL AND WHAT THE ALLIES HAD SAID ON THE PRESENT
OCCASION. BUT THESE REMARKS WERE OF SECONDARY IMPORTANCE.
THE MAIN EASTERN OBJECTION TO WHAT ALLIES HAD NOW PROPOSED
WAS THAT IT WAS TIED DIRECTLY WITH THE OVERALL WESTERN
PLAN.

40. US REP SAID KHLESTOV HAD MISUNDERSTOOD TWO POINTS MADE
BY ALLIED REPS. HE HAD INTERPRETED ALLIED PROPOSALS TO
MEAN THAT THE UNITED STATES WOULD NOT REDUCE ITS FORCES
IN PHASE II. ALLIED REPS HAD NOT SAID THSI. THEY HAD NOT
DEALT WITH THE QUESTION OF WHETHER THE UNITED STATES WOULD
OR WOULD NOT PARTICIPATE IN PHASE II REDUCTIONS. INSTEAD,
THEY HAD BEEN DEALING WITH THE QUESTION THAT THE EAST HAD
REPEATEDLY RAISED. ALLIES WERE ADDRESSING EAST'S STATED
CONCERN THAT IF, ONLY THE UNITED STATES ON THE WESTERN SIDE
REDUCED IN PHASE I, THE EAST WOULD HAVE NO ASSURANCE THAT THE
OTHER WESTERN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS WOULD REDUCE IN PHASE II.
THE ALLIES BELIEVED THEIR FORMULA MET THESE EASTERN CONCERNS.
US REP SAID ALLIED FORMULA REPRESENTED AN IMPORTANT NEW
STEP ON WESTERN PART ABOVE AND BEYOND THE FOCUS FORMULA.
PREVIOUS ALLIED STATEMENTS DID NOT RELATE TO ALL THE
REMAINING WESTERN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS OR TO ANY PARTICULAR
ONE OF THEM. ALLIED RPRESENT FORMULA INCLUDED THEM ALL.
PARTICIPANTS WERE NOW DISCUSSING THE POSSIBILITY OF A
COMMITMENT THAT THE FORCES OF ALL THE REMAINING WESTERN
DIRECT PARTICIPANTS WOULD BE INCLUDED IN REDUCTIONS. WESTERN
REPS HAD THEREFORE ANSWERED REPEATED EASTERN QUESTIONS ABOUT
WHETHER REMAINING WESTERN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS WOULD REDUCE.
THIS WAS THE QUESTION THAT THE ALLIES WERE ADDRESSING ON
THE PRESENT OCCASION, AND THA ALLIES BELIEVED THAT THEIR FORMULA
PROVIDED A PRACTICAL ANSWER TO THAT QUESTION. US REP SAID
IT WAS ALSO DESIRABLE TO POINT OUT THAT THE FOCUS FORMULA
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MENTIONED BY KHLESTOV ALSO HAD NOT ADDRESSED THE QUESTION OF WHETHER THE US WOULD MAKE REDUCTIONS IN PHASE II. HE WISHED TO EMPHASIZE THAT THE LATEST WESTERN PROPOSAL PROVIDED AN ADEQUATE MIDDLE ANSWER AND SHOULD CLEAR THE WAY TO AN AGREED ANSWER TO THE QUESTION OF WHOSE FORCES SHOULD BE REDUCED FROM THE OUTSET.

41. AFTER DISCUSSION, IT WAS AGREED TO HOLD THE NEXT INFORMAL SESSION ON MONDAY, JULY 15. THERE WAS ALSO SOME DISCUSSION OF THE DATE OF THE NEXT AND FINAL PLENARY SESSION IN THE PRESENT ROUND. KHLESTOV URGED THAT THE PLENARY SESSION NOW SCHEDULED FOR JULY 18M BE ADVANCED BY AT LEAST ONE DAY. HE ARGUED THIS WOULD BE MORE CONVENIENT FOR EASTERN DELEGATIONS. AFTER FURTHER DISCUSSION, WESTERN REPS AGREED TO PRESENT THE EASTERN PROPOSAL THAT THE FINAL PLEANRY TAKE PLACE ON JULY 17 INSTEAD OF JULY 18 TO THEIR ALLIED COLLEAGUES. REGARDLESS OF WHEN THE FINAL PLENARY WAS HELD, KHLESTOV INSISTED THAT ANY PUBLIC STATEMENT ON THE CLOSE OF THE PRESENT ROUND SHOULD MAKE THE POINT THAT THE ROUND WOULD BE CLOSING ON JULY 22.RESOR

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